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Abstract 
The Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system has been introduced as a 
simple, very low cost and efficient classical physical alternative to quantum key distribution systems. 
The ideal system uses only a few electronic components – identical resistor pairs, switches and 
interconnecting wires – to guarantee perfectly protected data transmission. We show that a 
generalized KLJN system can provide unconditional security even if it is used with significantly less 
limitations. The more universal conditions ease practical realizations considerably and support more 
robust protection against attacks. Our theoretical results are confirmed by numerical simulations. 
Introduction 
Incredibly huge amount of information is transferred in every second – electronic communication is 
getting one of the most important parts of the industry, economy, medicine, education, 
entertainment, personal life and many more. It is obvious that in several cases reliable protection of 
the information is essential and it is not easy at all. There are many methods and algorithms to 
encrypt data and although they appear practically unbreakable today, one can’t be sure about their 
reliability in the future. 
Natural physical processes and systems can be promising alternatives to digital encryption to hide 
information from the eavesdroppers. The most is expected from the quantum key distribution (QKD); 
however an extremely simple and low cost classical physical system has been proposed as an 
efficient alternative to provide unconditional security using only a few resistors, switches and wires1. 
The idea is surprisingly simple and elegant: the thermal (Johnson) noise of the resistor serves as the 
signal source and only a simple circuit is needed to establish communication between the two 
parties, usually named as Alice and Bob. The schematic of the circuit is shown on Figure 1.  
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Figure 1 The KLJN key exchanger uses identical pair of resistors at both ends. The voltage 
generators represent the thermal noise of the resistors. LH state is shown. 
At both ends of the communication line there is an identical pair of resistors with publicly known 
lower and higher values, RL and RH, respectively. Both communicating parties can connect one of the 
resistors to the interconnecting wire. It has been shown using the second law of thermodynamics1 
and mathematical statistics2 that the eavesdropper can’t distinguish between the two cases when 
different resistors are selected at the two ends, therefore one bit of information can be transferred 
with unconditional security. Note that the zero-mean Johnson noise voltages of the resistors are 
represented by voltage generators. The power spectral density of the thermal noise voltage is equal 
to 4kTR, where k is the Boltzmann constant and T is the temperature of the resistor R. The use of 
separate voltage generators allows high enough voltage amplitudes in practical applications, virtually 
emulates very high temperatures. Recently it has been proven using mathematical statistical 
methods that only this kind of noise can guarantee security3. 
The outstanding performance of the KLJN system has been demonstrated by the first practical 
realization using a digital signal processor based system4 and has inspired the development of 
another secret key exchange method5. The simplicity and flexibility of the system allowed the 
proposal of many possible applications in different environments including securing computer 
communications, hardware components, memories, processors, keyboards, mass storage devices, 
key distribution over the Smart Grid, ethernet cables, uncloneable hardware keys and automotive 
communication6-9. 
The ideal KLJN key exchange system is considered to be unconditionally secure; however numerous 
attacks were introduced using the non-ideal properties that appear in practical realizations. The 
tolerance of resistor values and temperature, the resistance of the interconnecting wires and 
switches, any deviation from the ideal noise distribution and even interference can cause 
information leak10-20. The latest attack is based on directional wave measurements and uses the finite 
resistance of the transmission wire21,23. There is a continuous debate about the validity and 
limitations about these attack methods. 
Any practical realization has limitations and exhibits non-ideal behaviour, therefore the question 
arises, how sensitive the security on the tolerance of the properties of the components is; how much 
the ideal cases can be approximated; are there any efficient methods to compensate the effects of 
non-ideal features? 
Here we generalize the KLJN key exchange protocol by using arbitrary resistors and we prove that in 
the ideal case it is still unconditionally secure, if the noise voltages are properly chosen. This allows 
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operating the practical realizations close to the ideal one and in the same time makes flexible, even 
real-time compensation techniques possible. We have carried out numerical simulations to confirm 
our theoretical results. 
Results 
The generalized KLJN key exchange protocol 
In the original KLJN system two identical resistor pairs are used at both ends of the communication 
wire. Here we allow the use of four arbitrarily chosen resistors as shown on Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2 The generalized KLJN key exchanger uses four different resistors and noise 
voltage generators. LH state is shown. 
The Johnson noise of the resistors is represented by separate voltage generators again. The 
eavesdropper Eve can measure the current IE(t) and the voltage VE(t) in the interconnecting wire and 
can process these signals to determine which resistors are connected to the wire. If in both the LH 
and HL cases the same information is obtained, then no information leak occurs. Table 1 summarizes 
the possibilities. 
State Alice Bob IE(t) VE(t) 
LH RLA, VLA RHB, VHB 
HBLA
LAHB
RR
tVtV

 )()(
 
HBLA
HBLALAHB
RR
tVRtVR

 )()(
 
HL RHA, VHA RLB, VLB 
LBHA
HALB
RR
tVtV

 )()(
 
LBHA
LBHAHALB
RR
tVRtVR

 )()(
 
Table 1 Selected components and quantities in LH and HL states. 
 
Conditions for security 
The eavesdropper can measure the variance of the voltage and current and the correlation of these 
signals. All these must be the same for both the LH and HL cases. 
First, consider the variance of the current in the LH and HL states: 
)()( 2,
2
, tItI HLELHE  . (1) 
Substituting the expressions of IE given in Table 1 we get: 
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The equivalence of the variance of the voltage fluctuations observed by Eve implies that  
)()( 2,
2
, tVtV HLELHE  . (3) 
Again, expanding these using the formulas for VE provided in Table 1 yields 
   2
2222
2
2222 )()()()(
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

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

. (4) 
Finally, it is required to have the same correlation between the current and voltage signals: 
)()()()( ,,,, tVtItVtI HLEHLELHELHE  . (5) 
Substituting the current and voltage expressions from Table 1 into Eqn. 5 results the following 
equation: 
LBHA
LBHAHALB
LBHA
HALB
HBLA
HBLALAHB
HBLA
LAHB
RR
tVRtVR
RR
tVtV
RR
tVRtVR
RR
tVtV










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. (6) 
The left hand side of this formula can be written as 
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and for the right hand side of Eqn. 6 we obtain 
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We have used the fact that the cross correlation terms are zero, since all voltage noise signals are 
independent. Using Eqn. 6, 7 and 8 finally we get 
5 
 
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
tV
RR
R
tV
RR
R
tV
RR
R
tV
RR
R
HA
LBHA
LB
LB
LBHA
HA
LA
HBLA
HB
HB
HBLA
LA







.(9) 
This equation is in agreement with the physical argument that the power flow from the two sides 
must be the same for HL and LH states20. 
In summary, Eqn. 2,4 and 9 must be satisfied in order to guarantee secure communication. 
Note here that in the case of the original KLJN protocol both sides of Eqn. 9 are zero and one can 
easily see that in agreement with the previous results1-3 the noise variance scales with the value of 
the corresponding resistor. In our generalized case the voltage and current signals observed by the 
eavesdropper are not independent, but they are the same for both the LH and HL states. 
Determining the voltage amplitudes 
According to the above it is possible to choose four arbitrary resistor values and one of the voltage 
variances. In the following example we assume that the variance of VLA(t) is given and the rest three 
must be calculated using Eqn. 2,4 and 9: 
LAHAHALALBLA
HBHBHAHBHALB
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It is important to note that since the variance is proportional to the temperature, the restrictions on 
the noise variances can be interpreted physically as having different temperatures for each resistor. 
Numerical simulations 
In order to confirm our theoretical results we have carried out numerical simulations. The variances 
and the correlation of the current IE and voltage VE were calculated for both the HL and LH cases. We 
have tested three different configurations as listed in Table 2. Three bit error rate (BER) values have 
been calculated using the variance of the current, variance of the voltage and the correlation data for 
the transfer of 1 million bits. The BER values are very close to 50% indicating that the leak is 
practically zero.  
HL LH )(
2 tIE  )(
2 tVE  )()( tItV EE  
RHA [kOhm] RLB [kOhm] RLA [kOhm] RHB [kOhm] BER [%] BER [%] BER [%] 
9 1 1 9 49.967 49.973 49.994 
10 5 1 9 49.985 49.980 49.979 
5 5 1 9 49.981 49.984 49.981 
Table 2 Bit error rate for three different configurations calculated using the variance of 
the current, variance of the voltage and the correlation coefficient. The first data row 
corresponds to the original KLJN configuration. 
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Figure 3 and 4 visualizes the statistics of the quantities that can be observed by the eavesdropper in 
the HL and LH states. It can be easily seen that in both states the histograms are practically identical, 
the eavesdropper can’t extract any information from the data using any of the three considered 
quantities. 
 
Figure 3 Histograms of the variance of the voltage VE and current IE obtained during the 
transfer of 106 bits. The HL state (RHA=10 kOhm, RLB=5 kOhm, VHA=2.179 V, VLB=0.816 V) 
is indicated with crosses and the LH state (RLA=1 kOhm, RHB=9 kOhm, VLA=1 V, 
VHB=1.186 V) is marked with circles. 
Figure 4 shows the correlation histogram of the current and voltage. The correlation is not zero in 
contrast to the original KLJN configuration2,3. On the right hand side the scatter plot corresponding to 
the joint probability distribution of the voltage and current can be seen. The asymmetrical shape 
indicates the non-zero correlation as well3 and it corresponds to a non-zero, but identical power flow 
from one side to the other both in the HL and LH cases20. 
 
Figure 4 On the left panel the histograms of the correlation of the voltage VE and current 
IE obtained during the transfer of 10
6 bits are plotted. The HL state (RHA=10 kOhm, 
RLB=5 kOhm, VHA=2.179 V, VLB=0.816 V) is indicated with crosses and the LH state 
(RLA=1 kOhm, RHB=9 kOhm, VLA=1 V, VHB=1.186 V) is marked with circles. On the right 
panel the 1000 points of the VE, IE scatter plot can be seen for a single bit transfer
24. 
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Discussion 
Our theoretical and numerical simulation results show that the KLJN key exchange protocol provides 
security even under significantly generalized conditions: the resistor values can be chosen arbitrarily. 
In order to ensure security the voltage noise variances must be chosen according to the equations we 
have presented above. This means that the required dependence of voltage amplitudes on resistor 
values has also been generalized. Considering the original physical picture this means that the system 
is not any more in thermal equilibrium, the temperature of the resistors will be different. However, 
since practical realizations use separate artificial noise generators to emulate the Johnson noise of 
the resistors, this does not mean any limitation or problem. On the other hand Eqn. 9 is equivalent to 
the assumption that the mean power flow in the two states are the same20. The original protocol is a 
special case in our approach, when both sides of Eqn. 9 equal zero.  
The generalized protocol helps to improve the security in practical applications significantly and 
allows new realizations as well. For example consider the original KLJN system using resistors with a 
given tolerance. In this case the original protocol will cause some information leak, however if the 
resistor values are measured, the voltage amplitudes can be slightly changed to eliminate the leak. 
Note that tuning the voltage amplitude is rather easy to implement by today’s precision analogue 
and digital circuits. It is easy to see, that even the parasitic resistance of switches and the 
interconnecting wire resistance can be compensated, it is a special case in our approach. This is in 
agreement with the complete elimination of the effect of wire resistance that has been discussed by 
Kish et al20. 
During the communication both Alice and Bob can measure the components’ resistance 
continuously; they can measure voltage at different points and can also determine the loop current. 
The on-line measurement of the communicating resistors, resistance of the switches and resistance 
of the interconnecting wire is possible, and the parties can inform each other about their 
observations even via a public link. Therefore it is also possible to implement real-time continuous 
information leak elimination. For example automatic compensation of the changes in the wire 
resistance is possible, when for any reason the interconnecting cable is replaced. These features are 
very important in practical applications, because the sensitivity of the original KLJN system on the 
non-ideal properties of the components can be dramatically reduced and several attack types can be 
eliminated. 
Methods 
Our calculations are mainly based on the mathematical statistical approach described in our recent 
publications in the subject2,3. We have calculated the variances of the quantities and the correlation 
between the considered signals. Agreement with previous results based on classical physical 
approach was also important and it has been demonstrated. 
Numerical simulations were based on a code written in the LabVIEW environment and the source 
code is available for download24. The simulation of the transfer of a single bit in the HL and LH state 
was carried out by generating 1000 samples to represent the four voltage noise signals. Then VE and 
IE observed by the eavesdropper were calculated. Using these data the variances of VE and IE and the 
correlation values were determined. 
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In order to check any possible information leak and to measure the statistics of the above mentioned 
quantities 1 million bits were transferred. The BER was calculated using all three indicators. During 
the BER estimation all bit transfers were taken for both the HL and LH states and the median was 
used as a threshold value to determine the bit state for an individual bit transfer. After this we have 
calculated the ratio of unsuccessful bit guessing to get the BER value. 
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